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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
rence that his testimony was material, necessary, and possibly essential
in aiding the parties in the preparation of their case. 124 Although the
decision is one of first impression,12 5 the reasoning is undeniably
sound.
Previous cases dealing with disclosure of witnesses' names spoke
only of those "present at the scene, who saw the accident,'1 26 or "who
were right there,"' 2 7 or who were "present at the time of the accident"
and were witnesses "of the event itself."'12 8 However, one notable au-
thority analyzed the implications of these holdings and forecast that
these phrases "can reasonably be regarded as embracing all of those
who witnessed at first hand any element that reflects on the liability
issue in the case."' 29 As evidenced by the decision, Judge Boyers ob-
viously concurs in this analysis. Moreover, federal practice would
undoubtedly sanction the result reached.13 0 Beyer is therefore a wel-
come addition to the other recent decisions which strive to make the
test for disclosure one of usefulness and reason.' 13
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Texas judgment against common carrier given
collateral estoppel effect in subsequent action brought by other plain-
tiffs in New York.
Although it is now well established in New York that a party
need not be given a day in court against a particular litigant 3 2 pro-
vided that there is an "identity of issue which has necessarily been
124 Id. at 223, 305 N.YS.2d at 267.
125 See Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion at 2, Beyer v. New York Tel.
Co., 61 Misc. 2d 222, 305 N.YS.2d 265 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
126 Sanfilipo v. Baptist Temple, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 767, 768, 276 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1967).
127 Newton v. Board of Educ., 52 Misc. 2d 259, 262, 275 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1966).
128 Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 414, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (1st Dep't
1964).
129 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3101, commentary 46-47 (1970). Accordingly, Professor
Siegel would include among those whose identity is disclosable the "bartender or drink-
ing companion who saw the party drunk" prior to the accident and "the witness around
the comer or a few blocks away who did not see the accident but saw one of the parties
driving out of control or at a high speed." Id. at 46.
130 For example, in Cannaday v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 19 F.R.D. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
interrogatories were permitted not only as to names and addresses of persons witnessing
the accident, but also as to persons otherwise having knowledge of the circumstances of
the accident, of plaintiff's injuries, and of the equipment used on the ship where the
accident occurred.
131 See, e.g., Peretz v. Blekicki, 31 App. Div. 2d 934, 298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't
1969); Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
132See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1956).
19701
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
decided in [a] prior action... and... a full and fair opportunity to
contest the [prior] decision . "133 academicians questioned the pro-
priety of further extending the doctrine of collateral estoppel13 4 to
cases involving a common carrier.13 5 Nevertheless, a recent lower court
case, Hart v. American Airlines, Inc.,136 has done just that and has
thereby provided an approach which avoids absurdity while discour-
aging forum shopping.
The causes of action in Hart arose from a crash of one of defen-
dant's airlines in which 58 passengers were killed. The deceased were
residents of many states; consequently, various actions were instituted
throughout the nation. In the first case tried to conclusion, American
Airlines was adjudged negligent, and a judgment was rendered against
it.3'7 The plaintiffs in the instant action moved for summary judgment
on the ground that American Airlines was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of negligence by virtue of the first judgment in
Texas. In opposition, the defendant's primary contention was that an
earlier ruling in Hart,18 which denied a similar motion for summary
judgment, was decisive. However, the court distinguished that ruling:
the controlling factor behind it was the nondomiciliary status of the
plaintiffs. And, although its earlier decision might discourage forum
shopping, it did not "preclude the application of the New York doc-
trine of collateral estoppel in an action brought by New York depen-
dents of deceased New York residents."'189
The court concluded that the prerequisites to the application of
the collateral estoppel doctrine were readily satisfied since the issue
of liability was identical to that previously adjudicated,140 and the de-
fendant had not sustained the burden of proving that it had not been
afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue of its liability
in the Texas action.
The decision in Hart provides a well-reasoned approach to com-
'33 Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). See The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 144 (1969).
134 For a review of significant aspects in the New York law of collateral estoppel, see
Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1969).
135 See, e.g., Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doc-
trine, 9 STAN. L. Ray. 281 (1957).
136 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
'37 Creasy v. American Airlines, Inc., - F. Supp. - (N.D. Tex. -), affd
sub. nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
138 31 App. Div. 2d 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1st Dep't 1969).
139 61 Misc. 2d at 43, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
140 Indeed, in an airplane crash there are absent any of the problems with
respect to "identity of issue" on liability which might arise in other types of
accidents involving multiple participants such as automobile accident cases.
Id., 304 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
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mon-carrier liability in situations such as these. It recognizes the state's
interest in protecting its domiciliaries 41 from an archaic application of
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel in other forums. 142 Furthermore,
it accentuates judicial aversion to inconsistent results. 143 Finally, it
safeguards against "forum shopping." However, there is a paucity of
case law in New York concerning the offensive use of a judgment by
one not a party to the prior action,144 and it is conceivable that under
slightly altered circumstances an opposite conclusion will be reached.145
Nevertheless, Hart should provide guidance to the courts in their con-
tinuing venture away from the doctrinaire of Glaser v. Huette.146
CPLR 3213: Judgment obtained against insured cannot serve as the
basis for a 3213 motion against the insurer.
CPLR 3213, as recently amended, permits the service of a sum-
mons and motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint in
actions based upon "an instrument for the payment of money only or
upon any judgment." The addition of the word "any" was intended to
avoid a construction which would limit the section's operation to
money judgments only.147 However, as illustrated in Holmes v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,148 this clarification may, in turn, present new problems
of interpretation.149
141 Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 NX.2d 526
(1961).
142 The court noted that most jurisdictions continue to observe the mutuality doc-
trine despite the fact that it is a "dead letter" in New York by virtue of B. P. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
143 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
144 Nevertheless, the offensive use of a judgment was undoubtedly sanctioned in B. R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
Valid precedent for Hart can be found in United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F.
Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
145 In Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969), the following factors were listed as determinant of whether a
party had had his day in court: the size of the daim, the forum of the prior litigation,
the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of
counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences
in the applicable law, and forseeability of future litigation. See also Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CoRaNEr L.Q. 724, 728-29 (1967).
146 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (ist Dep't), aff'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E.
193 (1931).
147"It is the purpose of the proposed amendment to enable a judgment creditor
who holds a foreign judgment ... to utilize a motion under 3213 regardless of whether
it awards a sum of money or any other relief." BENmm's CPLR 3213, at 32-11 (pam-
phlet ed. 1969).
148 33 App. Div. 2d 96, 305 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Ist Dep't 1969).
149 Cf. Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 186, 295
N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ist Dep't 1968); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648
1970]
